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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees the right 
of assistance of counsel in all criminal prosecutions.1  But courts have 
been mired in narrow textual interpretations of the Amendment for at 
least the last eighty years, and have only parsimoniously recognized 
some aspects of the right, taking the smallest of steps forward on each 
occasion, and not infrequently reversing direction while generously 
sowing the seeds of confusion.2 
How is it that this Amendment, surely a glorious ornament of the 
age of political enlightenment, has suffered so much textual and 
linguistic abuse at the hands of the judiciary?3  As Professor Sanjay 
Chhablani observes, “the Court has adopted a number of constructions 
of the Sixth Amendment that plainly contravene its text and are 
increasingly less protective of individual liberty.”4 
The reader can be forgiven for concluding that certain elements of 
the judiciary will do anything to limit citizens’ rights under the 
Constitution.  Far from being the guardians of the Constitution, those 
elements of the judiciary seem, in fact, to be its gatekeepers.  The twin 
paths of linguistic and jurisprudential mismanagement can be traced 
from approximately the time of the Great Depression until the present.5  
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 1.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 2.  But see Stephanos Bibas, Justice Kennedy’s Sixth Amendment Pragmatism, 44 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 211 (2013). 
 3.  Nobody has expressed this idea better or more passionately than Justice Story in his 
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (1833). 
 4.  Sanjay Chhablani, Disentangling the Sixth Amendment, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 487, 488-
89 (2009). 
 5.  A succession of ground breaking cases from that era demonstrate how this issue began to 
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As Alfredo Garcia has noted, “[t]he Supreme Court’s recent 
interpretation of the amendment has been marked by doctrinal 
inconsistency and by a failure to adhere to the functional and symbolic 
values that are inherent in the amendment.”6  More critically, Garcia 
believes that the “Court has adopted a crime control ‘ideology’, stressing 
efficiency rather than the core ideal of a fair trial that the amendment is 
designed to safeguard.”7 
As is well known, the Amendment, as it has stood for the last 220 
years, states: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have 
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature 
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.8 
II. MORE THAN THE MERE PRESENCE OF AN ATTORNEY 
Anyone reading this text will marvel at the simplicity and 
directness of the language.9  Much eighteenth century legal English is 
nowadays almost impenetrable as to its intention, but in this case, the 
meaning is as clear to us today as it must have been to newspaper 
readers when the Bill of Rights first appeared in the public press in 
1789.10 
And yet, even the most basic elements of the provision have been 
contended.  As Professor Justin Marceau has pointed out, it has not 
always been accepted that assistance of counsel is required to be 
effective for the promise of the Amendment to be fulfilled.11  In fact, it 
was almost 200 years after ratification in Congress before the U.S. 
be prominent from that time on, including the 1932 case of Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), 
and the slightly later case of Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). 
 6.  ALFREDO GARCIA, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT IN MODERN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE: A 
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE, ix (1992). 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 9.  See id. 
 10.  “Between 1789 and 1791, the question of whether we would even have a Bill of Rights 
was one of the most hotly debated issues of the day.  Legislatures discussed it; newspapers wrote 
about it; and people were passionate in their opinions.”  Hon. Damon J. Keith, Challenges for the 
Constitution in the 1990’s “How May the Constitution Continue to Meet the Emerging Needs of A 
Changing Nation,” 34 HOW. L.J. 483, 484 (1991). 
 11.  Justin F. Marceau, Embracing a New Era of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 14 U. PA. 
J. CONST. L. 1161, 1164-65 (2012). 
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Supreme Court finally took the plunge and recognized that assistance 
means effective assistance.12  But it is scarcely credible that it could have 
taken so long for such a simple idea to take hold.  How could anyone 
define assistance as a quality that could lack effectiveness and still be 
meaningful? Put even more simply, if assistance is not effective, can it 
still be called ‘assistance’?13  Finally, however, the Court rose to the 
occasion in Strickland v. Washington, stating “[t]hat a person who 
happens to be a lawyer is present at trial alongside the accused . . . is not 
enough to satisfy the constitutional command.”14 
The reading, which was tacitly accepted prior to Strickland, does 
follow a perverse type of textualist rationale: the framers did not say that 
assistance had to be effective and therefore, apparently, it could not be 
inferred.15  This is not to say that Strickland was a satisfactory result.  As 
Chhablani notes, the Strickland Court redefined a fair trial as one in 
which the result is reliable, rather than one in which the procedures are 
fair.16  Moreover, the Strickland burden of proof on the defendant to 
establish that an attorney’s ineffectiveness prejudiced the outcome is a 
heavy one.17 
But textualism taken to its extremes is always perverse and, 
moreover, when textualism actually involves a gross misreading of the 
text it is nothing less than repugnant.18  William Treanor, for example, 
argues that some scholars have tried to emphasize the Bill of Rights as 
rights “of the people”, rather than as the rights of individuals, and points 
out how, given the wording of the Sixth Amendment, this textualist 
interpretation is plainly incorrect.19  As will be shown below, evidence 
of poor textual interpretation is found in other examples of judicial 
 12.  Id. at 1165-66.  “In 1970, the Supreme Court in McMann v. Richardson established that 
[the] right to counsel requires effective and competent legal representation for defendants.”  Sean 
Michael Fitzgerald, Losing Sight of the Forest for the Trees: The Supreme Court’s Misapplication 
of Sixth Amendment Strickland Analysis in Missouri v. Frye and Lafler v. Cooper, 21 AM. U. J. 
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 681, 684 (2013) (citing McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 
(1970)). 
 13.  Marceau, supra note 11, at 1165-66. 
 14.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984). 
 15.  See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 389 (2010) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The 
Sixth Amendment as originally understood and ratified meant only that a defendant had a right to 
employ counsel, or to use volunteered services . . . “). 
 16.  Chhablani, supra note 4, at 542-43. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court’s New Hypertextualism: An Invitation 
to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 752 (1995) 
(arguing that “[i]n its new form, textualism resembles the extreme versions of intentionalism that 
the textualists have long criticized.”). 
 19.  William Michael Treanor, Taking Text Too Seriously: Modern Textualism, Original 
Meaning, and the Case of Amar’s Bill of Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 487 (2007). 
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tinkering with the meaning of the Amendment. 
III. A SPEEDY AND PUBLIC TRIAL 
There has long been contention as to whether the right to assistance 
of counsel applied to plea bargain hearings.20  It is only with the recent 
decisions in Missouri v. Frye21 and Lafler v. Cooper,22 which were 
decided by the Supreme Court on the same day, that this issue was at last 
resolved.  For decades, most criminal convictions have of course 
resulted from plea bargains, which have traditionally been viewed as 
pre-trial events.  Both Frye and Lafler have now given the official 
imprimatur to the daily reality of courts throughout the land: “plea 
bargaining . . . is the criminal justice system.”23  It is, therefore, only 
now official that at the plea bargain hearing the defendant is entitled to 
the assistance of counsel.24 
Again, the fact that this defect subsisted for so many decades is 
directly attributable to a textualist misreading of the Amendment, which 
has allowed the focus to be placed on the trial itself.  It appears that in 
construing the Amendment, judges have placed emphasis on the trial and 
the stages of the trial, quite simply because the thematic phrase of the 
Amendment ‘In all criminal prosecutions’ has been backgrounded by a 
school of thought which equated the trial with the prosecution, a view 
tacitly taken, if not expressed, in Strickland.25  Whether textualism can 
be reconciled with, “reliability,” however, is another matter.26 
The standard judicial interpretation of the Amendment therefore 
appears to have been as follows: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial 
~ by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime 
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previ-
ously ascertained by law, 
~ and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; 
~ to be confronted with the witnesses against him; 
 20.  The earlier decision of Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985), applied only to guilty pleas 
and thus left the door open to ambiguity on this issue. 
 21.  Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012). 
 22.  Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012). 
 23.  Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407. 
 24.  See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1399; Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1376. 
 25.  See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 26.  See Chhablani, supra note 4, at 543. 
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~ to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
~ and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.27 
The above formatting places the emphasis on trial.  This is 
understandable to a degree, given the historical perspective of the 
Amendment and in view of the evils it set out to address at the time, 
specifically that a person could be deprived of life or property without a 
trial.28  However, I believe a proper parsing of the Amendment should 
read: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right 
(i) to a (a) speedy and (b) public trial, by an (c) impartial jury of the 
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which 
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and 
(ii) to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; 
(iii) to be confronted with the witnesses against him; 
(iv) to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and 
(v) to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.29 
We, therefore, effectively, have these several rights subsumed into one, 
which are collectively “the right.”  In other words, the right is an 
integrated one – the sum is greater than the parts; they are not separable 
from each other.  As Randolph Jonakait has noted, the Sixth Amendment 
“requires reading each of its specific clauses not in isolation, but as part 
of one integrated Sixth Amendment.”30 
The right summarizes how the framers saw the process of providing 
the suspect with a fair opportunity to conduct his defense, in other words 
due process.  The right, as framed, particularizes the essential elements 
of the defense.  All aspects of the right pertain to the prosecution and not 
 27.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 28.  See United States v. Polouizzi, 687 F. Supp. 2d 133, 169-170 (E.D.N.Y. 2010), vacated, 
393 Fed. Appx. 784 (2d Cir. 2010) (unpublished) (explaining that the Sixth Amendment’s right to 
trial by jury “was envisaged as a check against overreaching by the new federal government”); 
Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 72 (1970) (“[T]he primary purpose of the jury is to prevent the 
possibility of oppression by the Government; the jury interposes between the accused and his 
accuser the judgment of laymen who are less tutored perhaps than a judge or panel of judges, but 
who at the same time are less likely to function or appear as but another arm of the Government that 
has proceeded against him.”). 
 29.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 30.  Randolph Jonakait, Foreword: Notes for a Consistent and Meaningful Sixth Amendment, 
82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 713, 713 (1992). 
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just the trial: in the prosecution and throughout the prosecution, hence– 
“in all criminal prosecutions”; moreover they apply to all criminal 
prosecutions, hence “in all criminal prosecutions.” 
IV. IN ALL CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS 
On the above basis, one would be forgiven for thinking that the 
right to counsel would long have applied to all prosecutions, and that 
this was a settled, established principle.  But this is not the case.  Powell 
v. Alabama, for example, only applied to capital prosecutions.31  The 
restriction as to capital trials appeared to be removed in Johnson v. 
Zerbst,32 but with reference to federal prosecutions only, and in Betts v. 
Brady,33 a habeas appeal from the state of Maryland, the Court held that 
there was no right of counsel for indigent defendants prosecuted by the 
state.34  The Court cited the fact that many states had laid down their 
own policies regarding indigent defendants’ right to counsel, and 
therefore “in the great majority of the States, it has been the considered 
judgment of the people, their representatives, and their courts that an 
appointment of counsel for indigent defendants in criminal cases is not a 
fundamental right.”35  However, in this instance the court seemed to 
ignore the fact that the Constitution of the state of Maryland does 
guarantee counsel as of right.36  In Betts, only Justice Hugo Black 
considered that the Fourteenth Amendment imposed an obligation on the 
states to fulfil the command of the Sixth Amendment37 to guarantee “any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”38  
However, the Court had consistently held, from the time of Barron v. 
Baltimore,39 that the first eight amendments of the Constitution applied 
only to the Federal government and not to the individual states.40  It was 
only much later in Gideon v. Wainwright41 that the Court recognized that 
the Fourteenth Amendment did indeed extend the protections of the 
 31.  Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71-72 (1932). 
 32.  Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). 
 33.  Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 
(1963). 
 34.  Id. at 473. 
 35.  Id. at 471. 
 36.  MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. ART. 21. 
 37.  Betts, 316 U.S. at 474. 
 38.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 39.  Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833). 
 40.  See, e.g., id. at 250 (stating that the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments to the 
Constitution apply only to the federal government). 
 41.  Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
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Sixth Amendment to all defendants in state prosecutions.42 
In other words, it took from 1791 to 1963 for defendants in all 
criminal prosecutions, federal and state, to be granted the right of 
assistance to counsel,43 a further 23 years for the Court to insist that that 
assistance had to be effective44 and another 26 years for recognition that 
assistance was required at stages outside the trial itself.45 
Does this now mean that every defendant is protected, throughout a 
criminal prosecution?  Alas, it does not, because, despite all of the 
tribulations that Sixth Amendment jurisprudence has gone through, 
further opportunities for distorting the intentions of the framers have 
never been capable of escaping determined judicial machinations.46 
V. ENTER THE CRITICAL STAGE DOCTRINE 
Under the critical stage doctrine, any prosecution is considered to 
consist of a number of key stages in addition to the trial itself.47  Despite 
the doctrine’s identification with Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, it 
finds its roots equally in Fourteenth Amendment case law, specifically 
Hamilton v. Alabama,48 where the Court ruled that the absence of 
counsel at the defendant’s arraignment was a violation of due process 
rights prescribed by the Fourteenth Amendment.49  In Hamilton, the 
Court referred to Powell v. Alabama,50 where it had stated that in capital 
cases the guiding hand of counsel was required “at every step in the 
proceedings.”51 
Critical stages include the indictment, some identification 
processes, and certain preliminary hearings.52  In United States v. 
 42.  Id. at 343. 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Jackson v. Michigan, 475 U.S. 625 (1986). 
 45.  Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012). 
 46.  In order to appreciate the truth of this point, we have only to look back at the length of 
time it took to have all defendants in all criminal prosecutions given the right of assistance to 
counsel, the delay in insisting that that assistance must be effective, and recognition that assistance 
needed to be available at stages of the prosecution which happened to lie outside of courtroom 
processes. 
 47.  See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226 (1967) (“It is central to that principle that 
in addition to counsel’s presence at trial, the accused is guaranteed that he need not stand alone 
against the State at any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where counsel’s 
absence might derogate from the accused’s right to a fair trial.”). 
 48.  Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961). 
 49.  Id. at 54. 
 50.  Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932). 
 51.  Id. at 68-69. 
 52.  Pamela R. Metzger, Beyond the Bright Line: A Contemporary Right-to-Counsel Doctrine, 
97 NW. U. L. REV. 1635, 1651-52 (2003).  Note, however, that trial consolidation hearings are 
excluded. See Van v. Jones, 475 F.3d 292, 313 (6th Cir. 2007). 
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Wade,53 the defendant had been identified post-indictment by the victims 
in an identification line-up without the presence of his attorney.  The 
Court held that an identification line-up was a critical stage of the 
prosecution and therefore the attorney ought to have been present.54  
However, in Kirby v. Illinois,55 the Court ruled that if the line-up occurs 
before indictment, the absence of counsel is not a violation of the 
Amendment.  In a sense, therefore, Kirby56 overrules Wade57 because 
police forces can simply choose to postpone the indictment.58  They are 
able to say, following the Court’s ruling in Kirby, that the Amendment 
has not been violated because the prosecution has not yet commenced.  
The logic of this is severely flawed and lends itself to absurdity: how can 
a stage considered to be critical post-indictment not be critical just 
because it occurs pre-indictment?59  If we are to keep the critical stage 
doctrine then it should be the case that the right attaches just because a 
critical stage has been reached, because such a critical stage is itself 
evidence that the prosecution is in progress.  To do otherwise is to 
reinforce an irrational formalism. 
Moreover, the Amendment was designed to ensure that the suspect 
is not prejudiced by any aspect of the prosecution.60  A prosecution is a 
legal pursuit of an individual for an alleged crime.  If a prosecution is a 
legal pursuit of an individual for an alleged crime, once that individual is 
targeted the organized forces of society are ranged against him-he is, 
effectively, being prosecuted and must therefore be entitled to the 
protection of the law.  Such was the view of the minority in the Kirby 
court.61  They followed the line of reasoning given in Wade.62  The risks 
posed by a pre-indictment line-up are no less than those posed by a post-
 53.  United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). 
 54.  Id. at 237. 
 55.  Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972). 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Wade, 388 U.S. 218. 
 58.  See Forte v. State, 759 S.W.2d 128, 134 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988), overruled by 
McCambridge v. State, 778 S.W.2d 70 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (explaining that “the basis and 
rationale of the Wade-Gilbert rule and the Kirby line of cases [is] difficult if not impossible to 
reconcile”). 
 59.  See Metzger, supra note 52, at 1668 (“Pre-charge bargaining is an important aspect of 
effective advocacy. When the government has committed itself to prosecuting an individual and its 
failure to file formal charges is a mere formality, a defendant should have the right to the assistance 
of counsel.”). 
 60.  See, e.g., Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 31 (1965) (stating that the right of trial by 
jury “was clearly intended to protect the accused from oppression by the Government”); see also 
Metzger, supra note 52, at 1639 (stating that the American colonies “emphasized the right to 
counsel as a guarantee against prosecutorial privilege and governmental overreaching.”). 
 61.  Kirby, 406 U.S. at 698-699. 
 62.  Wade, 388 U.S. 218. 
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indictment line-up.63  The minority further reasoned that to rely on the 
abstract notion that a prosecution commences only upon formal 
indictment is to deny the suspect the protection of the Amendment.64 
The same issues arose in the case of United States v. Ash65 where 
the identification process had been a photographic line-up.  Because 
there was no actual confrontation between prosecutor and defendant, it 
could not be viewed as a critical stage.66  For that reason, the absence of 
counsel was not a breach of the Amendment, even though there was the 
possibility of prejudice.67  However, this narrow interpretation ignores 
the basic fact that the photographic line-up was, in essence, a 
confrontation between prosecutorial and defense interests, even if the 
defendant was not physically present at the event.68 
Judicial thinking, therefore, is that only certain events within the 
overall prosecution are critical stages of the prosecution.69  Only critical 
stages are protected by the Amendment: if something occurs, even 
though it may be prejudicial to the defendant, then, unless it does so at a 
critical stage, the defendant is not entitled to the protection of the 
Amendment.70  But this is pure inductive reasoning.  Rather than 
deducing what constitutes a critical stage from the facts, courts have a 
priori limited the ambit of the critical stage to certain structural events 
and then dismissed as legally insignificant any event that is not a critical 
stage.71 To the contrary, the very fact that an event has the potential to 
be prejudicial should be sufficient to ensure that it is, per se, a critical 
stage. 
As is well known, the Amendment does not refer to critical stages 
of the prosecution.  Its language could not be clearer: it states “in all 
 63.  Kirby, 406 U.S. at 699. 
 64.  Id. at 698-99. 
 65.  United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973). 
 66.  Id. at 317. 
 67.  Id. at 319. 
 68.  See Stovall v Denno, 388 U. S. 293 (1967), for another aspect of the potential for tainted 
identification evidence.  In that particular case, a victim made an identification from a hospital bed 
of her alleged assailant, without the suspect having the benefit of counsel. 
 69.  For example, a defendant who is entering a guilty plea, whether the charge is a 
misdemeanor or felony, is a critical stage that enjoys the right to counsel.  Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 
77, 81 (2004). 
 70.  See, e.g., Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (“The Sixth Amendment does not grant an accused the right 
to have counsel present when the Government conducts a post-indictment photographic display, 
containing a picture of the accused, for the purpose of allowing a witness to attempt an 
identification of the offender.”). 
 71.  See Metzger, supra note 52, at 1636 (arguing that the “rigid right-to-counsel doctrine 
deprives modern criminal defendants of counsel at proceedings that are truly critical stages of 
contemporary criminal procedure”). 
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criminal prosecutions,”72 which in this context should mean throughout 
the entire prosecution process.  The device of the critical stage, while 
welcome in that it guarantees rights for a number of key events within 
the prosecution process, is a double-edged sword because it is able to 
exclude the operation of those rights for stages that are not considered 
critical.73 
IV. ATTACHMENT AND INVOCATION 
The Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel is generally 
considered to ‘attach’ when the criminal prosecution begins, usually 
when the suspect (i) learns of the charges against him and (ii) his liberty 
is affected.74  However, the attachment of the right to counsel does not 
mean that the suspect is entitled to the assistance of counsel.75  For that 
right to be actuated, proceedings must have reached a critical stage.76  
One would have thought that the fact that the prosecution had 
commenced was itself evidence of a critical stage, from which point the 
suspect “shall” or “must” enjoy the right and that attachment of the right 
would mean entitlement to exercise it.  In eighteenth-century 
English-and still found in some legal contexts today–to “enjoy” means to 
have the benefit or use of something, or to possess it.  Thus, by stating 
that the accused “shall enjoy the right,”77 it is clear that the Amendment 
commands that the accused has the benefit of the right: that it is 
indisputably his right unless he chooses not to exercise it and that it 
applies throughout the prosecution, viz. “in all prosecutions.” 
However, in practice, the attachment of the right to counsel and the 
right to assistance of counsel are separate events: the right to assistance 
is actuated by a critical stage.78  Under Jackson v. Michigan,79 once the 
right had attached police could not question a defendant in the absence 
of counsel even if the defendant waived his right to have an attorney 
present during questioning. This is because any direct confrontation 
between the prosecutorial authorities and/or the police and the defendant 
 72.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 73.  See, e.g., Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (no Sixth Amendment right to counsel in 
a pre-indictment line-up). 
 74.  United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 187-188 (1984). 
 75.  Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). 
 76.  See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984) (“The presumption that counsel’s 
assistance is essential requires us to conclude that a trial is unfair if the accused is denied counsel at 
a critical stage of his trial.”). 
 77.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 78.  United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967). 
 79.  Jackson v. Michigan, 475 U.S. 625 (1986). 
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is a critical stage requiring the assistance of counsel.80  The sole 
exception to this restriction was if the defendant initiated the dialogue 
and sought to confess.81 
In Montejo v. Louisiana,82 the Court rejected Jackson on the 
grounds that it was unworkable.  As Michael C. Mims points out, the 
Court reasoned that since some states require the assertion of his rights 
by the defendant in order for the right to attach, while other states 
consider attachment to commence by the court’s automatic appointment 
of an attorney, then in different states Jackson would be applied 
differently.83  Offered the opportunity of removing the distinction in 
Jackson between those defendants who asserted their Sixth Amendment 
right and those who obtained it from the trial court, the Supreme Court 
rejected this as being inconsistent with the ratio in Jackson.84  The Court 
considered that Jackson showed there to be a distinction between a 
defendant who had asserted his right and one who had not.  The former 
would be less likely to waive his right to allow a post-indictment 
interrogation, whereas the latter had not even asserted his right.85 
Thus, under Jackson,86 as interpreted by the Louisiana Supreme 
Court in Montejo,87 if the defendant had not asserted his right to 
assistance of counsel then law enforcement were entitled to question him 
without the assistance of counsel if he waived his Miranda88 right to the 
presence of an attorney.89  If, however, he had previously asserted his 
right to assistance of counsel then any confession he made would not be 
admissible.90 
The Montejo court not only considered that the potentially different 
applications of Jackson pointed to its unworkability.  They also 
determined that its main benefit, namely to prevent prosecution from 
coercing defendants into waiving their Sixth Amendment right, was 
outweighed by its potential cost, namely the danger that the guilty would 
 80.  “[G]overnment efforts to elicit information from the accused, including interrogation, 
represent “critical stages” at which the Sixth Amendment applies.”  Id. at 629-630 (citing Maine v. 
Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 (1985)). 
 81.  This is the bright line rule established in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981). 
 82.  Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778 (2009). 
 83.  Michael C. Mims, A Trap for the Unwary: The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel After 
Montejo v. Louisiana, 71 LA. L. REV. 345, 361 (2010). 
 84.  Id. at 361-62. 
 85.  Id. at 363. 
 86.  Jackson v. Michigan, 475 U.S. 625 (1986). 
 87.  State v. Montejo, 974 So. 2d 1238 (La. 2008), vacated sub nom., Montejo v. Louisiana 
556 U.S. 778 (2009). 
 88.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 89.  Montejo, 974 So. 2d at 1238. 
 90.  Id. at 1251-52. 
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walk free.91  The Court considered that the combined prophylaxis 
already being provided by exclusionary rules developed under the 
Miranda,92 Edwards,93 and Minnick94 line was sufficient to protect the 
defendant against coercive police tactics.95  However, the Sixth 
Amendment goes far wider than mere protection against police coercion: 
it is intended to provide the full weight of the justice system to ensure 
fairness throughout the criminal prosecution.96 
Notwithstanding this self-evident truth, instead of broadening the 
rule under Jackson to include defendants who had not asserted their right 
but had been granted it by the trial judge, the Court reversed Jackson, 
thus extinguishing the rule altogether,97  It no longer matters if the 
defendant has asserted his right or obtained it from the court, he may be 
questioned in the absence of his attorney post-indictment, providing he 
waives the right to have an attorney present98 under Miranda.99  But, as 
Michael C. Mims argues,100 the prophylactic comforts of the Miranda 
protections are wholly inadequate to address the Sixth Amendment right.  
Miranda was developed in order to avoid police coercion.101  The Sixth 
Amendment exists to ensure the integrity of the adversarial system.102  
However, Patterson v Illinois103 had already decided that a waiver of 
Miranda rights did not violate the Sixth Amendment.  In other words, a 
valid waiver under the Fifth Amendment will suffice to act as a waiver 
under the Sixth Amendment.104  The Court was able to attack Jackson in 
 91.  Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 793-794 (2009). 
 92.  Miranda, 384 U.S. 436. 
 93.  Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S 477 (1981). 
 94.  Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990). 
 95.  Montejo, 556 U.S. at 794-95. 
 96.  See, e.g., Meredith B. Halama, Loss of a Fundamental Right: The Sixth Amendment as a 
Mere “Prophylactic Rule,” 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 1207, 1241 (1999) (“The Sixth Amendment exists 
to protect the fairness and balance of our adversarial system.”); Alfredo Garcia, Clash of the Titans: 
The Difficult Reconciliation of a Fair Trial and a Free Press in Modern American Society, 32 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1107, 1108 (1992) (arguing that “the rights conferred on the accused by the 
Sixth Amendment are designed to ensure fairness in the criminal process”). 
 97.  Montejo, 556 U.S. at 797. 
 98.  In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens stated: “Today’s decision eliminates the rule 
that ‘any waiver of Sixth Amendment rights given in a discussion initiated by police is presumed 
invalid’ once a defendant has invoked his right to counsel.  Id. at 810 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 99.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 100.  Mims, supra note 83, at 369. 
 101.  Id. at 352-53. 
 102.  Id. at 355. 
 103.  Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 (1988). 
 104.  Id. at 298-99.  It should be noted that in Patterson the defendant at no time requested 
counsel.  He had been indicted, but had not asserted his right to counsel.  It also bears observing that 
the minority in Patterson did not accept that a waiver under Miranda sufficed to satisfy the Sixth 
Amendment requirement, given that the waiver of a right to have an attorney present during 
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this way because, at an earlier stage in Montejo’s appeal, the Louisiana 
Supreme Court had held that, under Jackson, a defendant must request 
counsel or otherwise assert his right to counsel, in order to invoke his 
Sixth Amendment rights.105  According to the Louisiana Supreme Court, 
since Montejo had not made such a request or asserted a right to counsel 
in any other way, he had not activated the protection of the 
Amendment.106  This is surely a very small, pettifogging point: how was 
Montejo to know, when told that counsel would be appointed for him, 
that his Sixth Amendment rights were not being engaged?  Moreover, 
following Johnson v. Zerbst, the defendant did not make “an intentional 
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right”.107  Standing ‘mute’ 
can hardly be described as a voluntary, knowing or intelligent waiver.108  
Further, as the dissenting voices in Montejo argued, it is not significant 
how the attorney-client relationship comes about, the point is that in 
Montejo’s case it must have attached—even though by court 
appointment.109 
If the words “shall enjoy the right” mean anything, then surely an 
insistence on the assertion of the right is a distortion of the 
Amendment’s intent.110  In this context—and this is not a matter of 
subjective interpretation—”shall” means “must.”111  It is obligatory that 
the suspect has the right, subject only to a voluntary, intelligent and 
knowing waiver. 
Further, as Michael Mims points out,112 there is now a fatal 
muddying of the waters between the right under the Fifth Amendment, 
questioning is hardly the same thing as the waiver of a right to have assistance of counsel. 
 105.  State v. Montejo, 974 So. 2d 1238, 1260-1261 (La. 2008), vacated sub nom., Montejo v. 
Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778 (2009).  See also Montoya v. Collins, 955 F. 2d 279 (1992). 
 106.  Id. at 1260-61. 
 107.  Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,464 (1938). 
 108.  See generally State v. Carter, 664 So. 2d 367, 383 (La. 1995) (stating that “something 
more than mere mute acquiescence in the appointment of counsel is necessary to show the 
defendant has asserted his right to counsel sufficiently to trigger the enhanced protection provided 
by Michigan v. Jackson’s prophylactic rule.”). 
 109.  Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 804 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 110.  See id. at 809 (“[T]he Court fails to identify the real reliance interest at issue in this case: 
the public’s interest in knowing that counsel, once secured, may be reasonably relied upon as a 
medium between the accused and the power of the State. That interest lies at the heart of the Sixth 
Amendment’s guarantee, and is surely worthy of greater consideration than it is given by today’s 
decision.”). 
 111.  Except when used by the first person singular, e.g. ‘I shall’, the word ‘shall’ always 
means ‘must.’  Nowadays, law framers tend to avoid ‘shall’, but it is still found in American laws–
the Patriot Act, for example: “The Director of the United States Secret Service shall take 
appropriate actions . . .” and many other examples–also means ‘is obliged to,’ ‘has a duty to.’ 
 112.  Mims, supra note 83, at 370. 
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as held in Edwards v. Arizona,113 and the right under the Sixth 
Amendment.  This is contrary to the intent of the Sixth Amendment: 
once the prosecution commences the defendant ought to have the 
protection of the Sixth Amendment.  Falling back on Miranda, as though 
it were a default of some kind, is nothing less than a sham. 
VII. CONCLUSION: HIGH LEGAL ART AND JUDICIAL DISINGENUOUSNESS 
Despite its conceptual shortcomings, as outlined above, the critical 
stage doctrine at least provides some protections, but overruling 
Jackson114 has diminished the significance of the critical stage, and 
further weakened the scope and effectiveness of the Sixth Amendment.  
Equally alarming in this context was the decision in Kansas v Ventris115 
where it was held that the defendant can no longer exclude as of right 
pre-trial “uncounseled admissions elicited by government agents.”116  
The court’s explanation for this ruling, which involves a particularly 
convoluted interpretation of the Massiah117 doctrine, was that the 
violation occurred pre-trial and thus its impact on the outcome of the 
trial was irrelevant.118  Professor James Tomkovicz considers the 
decision in Ventris to be “dubious and disingenuous” and “hopelessly 
misguided.”119  The decision in Ventris is undoubtedly a serious 
interpretative flaw in that, once again, it equates the trial with the 
prosecution.120 
The Sixth Amendment121 is a pillar of the U.S. Constitution, itself 
the highest legal art of the eighteenth, or indeed any other, century, in 
any country.  Yet its first two centuries of existence have not delivered 
its promise in anything like the way in which the framers must have 
envisaged.  It has been haggled over and mangled linguistically and 
jurisprudentially possibly more than any other constitutional 
provision.122  The reader must hope that these onslaughts have not 
 113.  Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S 477 (1981). 
 114.  Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986). 
 115.  Kansas v. Ventris, 556 U.S. 586 (2009). 
 116.  James J. Tomkovicz, Sacrificing Massiah: Confusion over Exclusion and Erosion of the 
Right to Counsel, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1 (2012). 
 117.  Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). 
 118.  Ventris, 556 U.S. at 593-94. 
 119.  Tomkovicz, supra note 116, at 1. 
 120.  See Ventris, 556 U.S. at 596 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“We have never endorsed 
the notion that the pretrial right to counsel stands at the periphery of the Sixth Amendment.  To the 
contrary, we have explained that the pretrial period is ‘perhaps the most critical period of the 
proceedings’ during which a defendant ‘requires the guiding hand of counsel.’”). 
 121.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 122.  See Frank O. Bowman, III, Debacle: How the Supreme Court Has Mangled American 
Sentencing Law and How it Might Yet Be Mended, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 367 (2010) (discussing a 
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wounded it fatally and that the judicial activism which has long been its 
lot to endure will one day be replaced by a new spirit of the laws, 
or-rather-by that same spirit of the laws that acted as the wellspring for 
the inception of the Bill of Rights at a time when an anxious legislature 
saw itself as the bulwark between tyranny and civilization, and knew 
that one of its main tasks was to ensure the protection of the individual 
from the ravages of powerful and despotic governments.123 
 
related topic in Sixth Amendment jurisprudence). 
 123.  See generally BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS (D.W. Carrithers ed., 
1977). 
 
